

Message Text

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C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 202991 TOSEC 100179

EXDIS

FOLLOWING REPEAT MOSCOW 12099 ACTION SECSTATE 25 AUG 75

QUOTE

C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 12099

EXDIS

E.O. 11652 XGDS-3 IMPOSSIBLE TO DETERMINE

TAGS: PARM, UR, US

SUBJECT: U.S.-SOVIET PUGWASH DISCUSSIONS ON STRATEGIC ISSUES

1. SUMMARY. ARBATOV HAS TOLD A MEMBER OF A VISITING PUGWASH COMMITTEE THAT THERE IS "NO POSSIBILITY" OF IMPLEMENTING THE VLADIVOSTOK AGREEMENT IF THE U.S. REFUSES TO ACCEPT A BAN ON CRUISE MISSILES. THE COMMITTEE (THE "SOVIET-AMERICAN DISARMAMENT STUDIES GROUP" CONSISTING OF KLEIMAN OF THE NEW YORK TIMES; LONG OF CORNELL; BROOKS OF HARVARD; YORK OF CAL TECH; RATHJENS OF MIT; GARWIN OF IBM; AND KNOTT) MET WITH SOVIET COUNTERPARTS IN DISCUSSION AUGUST 20-22 AT THE ACADEMY OF SCIENCES AND AT THE USA INSTITUTE. MOST OF THE GROUP'S PRESENTATION DURING THESE MEETINGS CENTERED AROUND THE "SCHLESINGER COUNTER FORCE PROGRAM",
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WHICH THEY DESCRIBED AS A COUNTERWEIGHT TO THE SOVIET FORCED DEPLOYMENT OF HIGH-PAYLOAD SYSTEMS. THE GROUP SUGGESTED THAT THE U.S. WOULD SLOW IT'S COUNTERFORCE PROGRAM DOWN IN EXCHANGE FOR SOVIET RESTRAINT IN ITS PRESENT DEPLOYMENT PROGRAM. THE SOVIETS

WERE AWARE THAT THE GROUP HAD MET WITH SECRETARIES KISSINGER AND SCHLESINGER BEFORE THEIR DEPARTURE FROM WASHINGTON, AND PROBABLY CONSIDER THE GROUP'S PRESENTATIONS TO BE AUTHORITATIVE. END SUMMARY.

2. KLEIMAN, ALONG WITH OTHER MEMBERS OF THE GROUP, DEBRIEFED THE AMBASSADOR AUGUST 22. HE RELATED THAT AT THE BEGINNING OF THE SESSION AT THE USA INSTITUTE (SOVIET PARTICIPANTS ARE LISTED BELOW), ARBATOV, WHO COULD SPEND ONLY A SHORT TIME WITH THE GROUP, ASKED THAT THE AGENDA BE CHANGED TO ALLOW DISCUSSION TO BEGIN ON THE TOPIC OF THE "SCHLESINGER DOCTRINE". KLEIMAN AND GARWIN SAID THAT THE PRESENTATION BY THE U.S. GROUP MADE THE FOLLOWING POINTS:

- THE ADMINISTRATION IS CONSCIOUS OF NEED FOR SPEEDY CONCLUSION OF SALT II BECAUSE OF APPROACHING ELECTION YEAR.
- THE U.S. IS SHOWING RESTRAINT. SLOWING OF THE DEVELOPMENT SCHEDULE FOR THE MARV SYSTEM FROM A MINUTEMAN III TO AN MX APPLICATION WAS CITED AS AN EXAMPLE.
- THE GROUP SUGGESTED THAT IF THE SOVIETS WOULD SLOW DEPLOYMENT OF HIGH-PAYLOAD SYSTEMS AND SLOW THEIR RATE OF TEST-FIRINGS, THE U.S. WOULD RESPOND IN ALIKE MANNER. GARWIN SAID THAT THE GROUP POINTED OUT THAT DEPLOYMENT OF SINGLE WARHEAD MINUTEMEN III USING THE MARK 12A WARHEAD, AS AN EXAMPLE, COULD ALLOW MOVEMENT AWAY FROM MIRV'ED MINUTEMEN. THE CRUCIAL QUESTION FOR SCHLESINGER, THEY SAID, IS WHETHER THE SOVIETS ARE MOVING TOWARD ACHIEVEMENT OF A FIRST STRIKE CAPABILITY. (GARWIN NOTED THAT DURING OTHER DISCUSSIONS THE U.S. GROUP EXPRESSED PERSONAL VIEW THAT A TRUE FIRST STRIKE CAPABILITY IS PROBABLY NOT FEASIBLE; THE GROUP ALSO STRESSED TO THE SOVIETS, HOWEVER, THAT THE ADMINISTRATION HAS NO CHOICE BUT TO TAKE A WORST POSSIBLE CASE VIEW OF ANY INDICATIONS OF SOVIET MOVEMENT IN THAT DIRECTION). THE GROUP CONTINUED THAT IF THE SOVIETS CONTINUE RAPID DEPLOYMENT, SCHLESINGER WILL BE FORCED TO MATCH IT. IF THE SOVIETS SLOW DOWN, THE U.S. WILL SLOW DOWN AS WELL.

3. THE SOLE SOVIET RESPONSE TO THESE PRESENTATIONS, ACCORDING TO THE GROUP, WAS A STATEMENT BY ZHURKIN, USA INSTITUTE DEPUTY DIRECTOR, THAT A SLOWDOWN IN THE TEST-FIRING RATE MIGHT BE POSSIBLE. ZHURKIN MADE CLEAR AT THE END OF THE DISCUSSIONS, HOWEVER, THAT THE CONFIDENTIAL

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U.S. GROUP'S PRESENTATION WOULD BE PASSED ON TO "VERY HIGH" LEVELS.

4. KLEIMAN RELATED TO THE AMBASSADOR THAT ARBATOV HAD TAKEN HIM ASIDE AT ONE POINT AND TALKED AT LENGTH ON THE DANGER POSED FOR SALT II BY U.S. INSISTENCE ON RETENTION OF CRUISE MISSILES. ARBATOV SAID THAT THE SOVIETS HAD UNDERSTOOD AT VLADIVOSTOK THAT ALL MISSILES WOULD BE INCLUDED IN THE CEILINGS. ARBATOV SAID THAT THE U.S. POSITION ON CRUISE MISSILES HAD COME AS A "BIG SURPRISE"-- "ALMOST A BETRAYAL." ARBATOV CONCLUDED THAT THERE WAS "NO POSSIBILITY" OF AGREEMENT ON A TREATY ON VLADIVOSTOK TERMS IF CRUISE MISSILES ARE TO BE RETAINED BY THE U.S. KLEIMAN SAID THAT HE HAD REPLIED THAT THE U.S. UNDERSTANDING WAS THAT CRUISE MISSILES HAD NOT BEEN INCLUDED IN VLADIVOSTOK. THE SUBJECT OF SUCH MISSILES

HAD FIRST BEEN BROUGHT UP BY THE SOVIETS IN GENEVA. KLEIMAN SAID THAT A FURTHER AGREEMENT--A SALT III--WOULD BE NECESSARY TO REGULATE THEM.

5. GARWIN TOLD THE AMBASSADOR THAT HE HAD PROPOSED A SCHEME TO THE SOVIETS (IN OPEN SESSION) FOR CONTROL OF CRUISE MISSILES. HE SAID HE HAD PROPOSED THAT
-- SALT II THE U.S. AND USSR AGREE ON A BAN ON "INTERCONTINENTAL" CRUISE MISSILES;
--IN SUBSEQUENT NEGOTIATIONS (SALT III), THEY AGREE ON A BAN ON AIR LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILE (ALCM) WITH A RANGE OVER 2700 KILOMETERS; THAT THEY AGREE THAT ALCM'S WITH RANGE FROM 600 TO 2700; KILOMETERS BE ALLOWED WITH THE PROVISIO THAT LAUNCHING AIRCRAFT BE COUNTED AS A MIRV'ED LAUNCHER;AND THAT ALL SEA-LAUNCHED AND SURFACE-LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILE OF WHATEVER RANGE, BE BANNED.
THE GROUP NOTED NO IMMEDIATE SOVIET REACTION TO THE PROPOSAL.

6. GARWIN REPORTED THAT THE MOST IMPORTANT QUESTION IN THE MINDS TO THE SOVIETS PARTICIPATING IN THE DISCUSSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE ACADEMY OF SCIENCES (LISTED BELOW) SEEMED TO BE WHETHER THE U.S. RETAINED ITS INTEREST IN COMING TO A SPEEDY AGREEMENT ON SALT II. WHEN SATISFIED THAT THIS WAS INDEED THE CASE, THEIR INTEREST IN THE DISCUSSIONS SEEMED TO FALL OFF. (THE GROUPS DESCRIBED THE ACADEMY'S PARTICIPATION IN THE SESSION AS "VERY DISAPPOINTING" AND AS SHOWING EVIDENCE OF POOR PREPARATION.) PAVLECHENKO DID EVINCE SOME INTEREST IN THE "SCHLESINGER COUNTERFORCE DOCTRINE," BUT CONCLUDED THAT IT WAS MOSTLY EYEWASH--ABSTRACT THEORY SET UP
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TO JUSTIFY EXPANDING DEFENSE SPENDING. KNOTT RELATED THAT THE U.S. GROUP BELIEVED IT HAD EFFECTIVELY DISABUSED PAVLECHENKO OF THE INTERPRETATION BY STRESSING THE REAL CONCERN FELT IN THE U.S. AS A RESULT OF THE SOVIETS' RAPID DEPLOYMENT OF HIGH-PAYLOAD SYSTEMS AND PORTRAYING THE "SCHLESINGER DOCTRINE" AS THE U. S. REACTION TO THIS DEPLOYMENT.

7. PARTICIPATING IN THE USA INSTITUTE SESSION FROM THE SOVIET SIDE, IN ADDITION TO ARBATOV (BRIEFLY) AND ZHURKIN, WERE: R.G. BOGDANOV,NOW A DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF THE INSTITUTE AND FORMERLY WITH THE POLICY PLANNING STAFF OF MFA; YU. ROSLYAKOV, OF THE POLICY PLANNING STAFF; YU. G. STREL'TOSOV, WHO WORKS UNDER M.A. MIL'SHTEYN AT THE INSTITUTE; YU. A. SHVEDKOV, OF THE INSTITUTE; CHETVERIKOV, CHOUSELOR, KAPROLOV, SECOND SECRETARY, AND KONYASHKOV (ALL USA DIVISION, MFA); AND G.S. KHOZIN, USA INSTITUTE.

8. PARTICIPATING IN THE ACADEMY OF SCIENCE DISCUSSIONS WERE, INTER-ALIA,
M.A. MARKOV, CHAIRMAN OF THE SOVIET GROUP AND DIRECTOR OF THE ACADEMY'S NUCLEAR PHYSICS DEPARTMENT;
P.L. KAPITSA, A MEMBER OF THE ACADEMY PRESIDIUM;
I.YE. MIKHAL'TSEV OF THE ACADEMY;

N.P. FEDERENKO, DIRECTOR OF THE ECONOMICS DEPARTMENT;
V.G. TRUKHANOVSKIY, EDITOR OF QUESTIONS OF HISTORY;
V.S. YEMELYANOV, CHAIRMAN OF THE ACADEMY'S COMMISSION ON
SCIENTIFIC PROBLEMS OF DISARMANEMNT"; AND PAVLECHENKO, WHO WAS
NOT FURTHER IDENTIFIED.
STOESSEL

UNQUOTE. INGERSOLL

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